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Abstract: This paper studies the diffusion of biopharmaceuticals across European countries,
focusing on anti-TNF drugs, which are used to treat autoimmune diseases (e.g.,
rheumatism, psoriasis). We use detailed sales information on the three brands
Remicade, Enbrel and Humira for nine European countries covering the period from
the first launch in 2000 until becoming blockbusters in 2009. Descriptive statistics
reveal large variations across countries in per-capita consumption and price levels both
overall and at brand level. We explore potential sources for the cross-country
consumption differences by estimating several multivariate regression models. Our
results show that large parts of the cross-country variation are explained by time-
invariant country-specific factors (e.g., disease prevalence, demographics, health care
system). We also find that differences in income (GDP per capita) and health spending
(share of GDP) explain the cross-country variation in consumption, while relative price
differences seem to have limited impact.
Response to Reviewers: See attachments.
Powered by Editorial Manager® and ProduXion Manager® from Aries Systems Corporation
1 Introduction
Diffusion of new medicines is important for pharmaceutical companies as it increases the
returns on their R&D investments and thereby their innovation incentives. Diffusion of new
medicines is also crucial for patients as they get access to new drug therapies that might
be more effective in treating their disease. Despite the obvious importance of diffusion of
pharmaceutical innovations, the existing knowledge is scarce.1
Our paper aims at filling this gap in the literature by exploring the cross-country
variation in pharmaceutical sales. We focus on a group of biopharmaceuticals called
Tumor Necrosis Factor inhibitors, hereafter called anti-TNF drugs, that treat autoimmune
diseases such as arthritis and psoriasis. The first brand, Remicade, was introduced on the
US market in the end of 1998. The second brand, Enbrel, entered the market shortly after,
while the third brand, Humira, was launched a couple of years later. These products are
now global blockbusters with total sales revenues exceeding $20 billion in 2011.2
To study the diffusion of anti-TNF drugs, we use a data set with detailed sales informa-
tion of anti-TNF brands (Remicade, Enbrel, and Humira) across nine European countries
(Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland).
Our data include monthly product-level information over a ten year period from 2000 to
2009, which covers the first launch of anti-TNF drugs in Europe until these drugs be-
come top-sellers on national markets. The descriptive statistics reveal surprisingly large
cross-country differences. The average per-capita consumption in the country with highest
consumption (Norway) is more than 350 percent higher than the country with the lowest
consumption (Italy). The consumption differences are also large between neighbouring
countries. For instance, Spain has 75 percent higher per-capita consumption than Italy.
To explore the sources of the cross-country variation, we estimate several multivariate
regression models. Since we have a panel data set with monthly product-level observations
across several countries, we can control for time-invariant country-specific factors that are
1There are a few recent exceptions, e.g., Jo¨nsson et al. (2008), Berndt et al. (2007), Desiraju et al.
(2004), and Frech and Miller (2004). We return to these studies below.
2These figures are collected from the annual reports of Abbott, Merck, Amgen and Pfizer for 2011,
which are publicly available on the companies’ webpages.
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likely to explain differences in consumption.3 This includes factors such as population
size, health status, health-care system, and, importantly, the prevalence of autoimmune
diseases. As expected, the estimated differences in per-capita consumption across countries
are much smaller than indicated by the descriptive statistics. For instance, the difference
between the countries with the highest (Norway) and lowest (Italy) consumption is now
reduced to about 170 percent. Thus, country-specific (time-invariant) factors account for
about half of the cross-country variation in per-capita consumption of the anti-TNF drugs.
We analyse the remaining cross-country differences in consumption by successively
introducing sets of explanatory variables. First, we include the number of approved in-
dications for each of the anti-TNF drugs. This variable varies across products and over
time, but not across the countries in our sample, since the approvals are EU wide. As
expected, we find a positive effect of the number of approvals on the average per-capita
consumption. Second, we include the price of the anti-TNF brands. Differences in relative
prices across countries might explain the variation in consumption. We find that lower
prices are associated with higher consumption levels, but the cross-country differences are
almost the same as before. Third, we include income, measured by the gross domestic
product (GDP) per-capita, as well as health expenditures as a share of GDP. We find that
both higher income and health spending have a positive effect on the consumption of anti-
TNF drugs, but also explain consumption differences across countries. Thus, we conclude
that cross-country variation in the diffusion of anti-TNF drugs is to a large extent due to
time-invariant country-specific factors (e.g, disease prevalence, demographics, health sta-
tus, etc.) but also country (per-capita) income and health spending, while relative price
differences across countries have no significant impact.
As mentioned above, the literature on diffusion of pharmaceuticals across countries
is scarce.4’5 However, there are some recent exceptions. Jo¨nsson et al. (2008) offer a
3We also control for time-invariant product-specific factors (e.g., treatment effects, side-effects, admin-
istration form, etc.) that are likely to explain differences in consumption across the anti-TNF brands, as
well as time trends in consumption.
4The empirical literature on cross-country differences in the prices of pharmaceuticals is much larger,
see e.g., Danzon (1999), Danzon and Chao (2000), Danzon and Furukawa (2003), and Brekke et al. (2011).
5There are some studies on diffusion of pharmaceuticals within countries, see e.g., Berndt et al. (2003)
and Chintagunta et al. (2009).
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descriptive analysis of the sales of anti-TNF drugs in a wide set of countries (also outside
Europe) for the period of 2000 to 2006. They find large cross-country variation in the per-
capita sales revenues. High-income countries have substantially higher per-capita sales
revenues of anti-TNF drugs than poorer countries, but there is also large variations across
countries with fairly similar income levels.6 Berndt et al. (2007) study the diffusion of new
drugs across 15 countries and three therapeutic classes (antihypertensives, antidepressants,
antiepileptics) using quarterly sales data over a 12-year period from 1992 to 2003. They
find substantial heterogeneity across therapeutic classes and countries in diffusion of new
medicines.7 Desiraju et al. (2004) study the diffusion of new pharmaceuticals in developed
and developing countries. Using data from fifteen countries, they find that developing
countries tend to have lower diffusion speed and maximum penetration level compared to
developed countries. They also find that per-capita expenditures on health care have a
positive effect on diffusion speed (particularly for developed countries), while higher prices
tend to decrease diffusion speed.8
The contribution of our study is two-fold. First, we contribute to the particular study of
the consumption of anti-TNF drugs. We do so by offering a detailed, exploratory analysis
of the diffusion of anti-TNF drugs. The literature on anti-TNF drugs is scarce despite the
fact that these drugs are among the most significant pharmaceutical innovations in recent
time, especially if measured in sales. We complement the study by Jo¨nsson et al. (2008)
by focusing on the consumption (not sales revenues) of these drugs, and extend their
study by investigating more closely the sources of the large cross-country differences that
are observed. In particular, we use multivariate regression that allows us to statistically
test the relationship between consumption of anti-TNF drugs and several explanatory
6There is also a study by Dalen et al. (2012) on the anti-TNF drug market using Norwegian data. They
find that changing the funding of anti-TNF drugs from the central government (social insurance agency) to
the public hospital enterprises has a significant effect on pricing and market shares of the three anti-TNF
brands.
7Berndt et al. (2007) also study the role of promotion on the overall consumption and the relative share
of old and new medicines within a therapeutic class. They find that promotion has a strong market share
effect within therapeutic class, while the effect on overall consumption is weaker.
8There is also a study by Frech and Miller (2004) that analyse the cross-national differences in utilisation
of overall pharmaceuticals. However, this study is mainly concerned with the impact of cross-national
consumption differences on quality of life and obesity.
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variables (e.g., income, health spending, etc), but also test for the importance of country-
and product-specific time-invariant factors. Second, our study contribute to the more
general literature on diffusion of new medicines. We focus on more ”similar” countries
than in Berndt et al. (2007) and Desiraju et al. (2004), but still find substantial variation
in per-capita consumption. Our contribution is to demonstrate that the cross-country
variation to a large extent is explained by time-invariant country-specific factors, such as
disease prevalence, demographics, health care system, and that empirical studies need to
account for such factors when analysing diffusion of new drugs across countries. We also
show that income and health spending are important explanatory variables, while perhaps
somewhat surprisingly price differences seem to have limited impact.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we briefly present the market
for anti-TNF drugs. In Section 3 we describe our data and sample, and provide some
descriptive statistics on cross-country variation in consumption, prices, etc. In Section 4
we present the empirical model and report our empirical results. Finally, in Section 5 we
draw some conclusions and make some concluding remarks.
2 The market for anti-TNF drugs
Tumor necrosis factor (TNF) is a cytokine (chemical messenger) that is involved in the
regulation of immune cells by promoting the inflammatory responses. If the body produces
excessive amounts of TNF, this can cause several medical problems related to autoimmune
disorders such as rheumatoid arthritis, ankylosing spondylitis, Crohn’s disease, psoriasis,
etc. These disorders can be treated by using anti-TNF drugs, which reduce the effect
of TNF and, in turn, the inflammatory reactions associated with autoimmune diseases.
However, since TNF is a part of the immune system, treatment with anti-TNF drugs can
generate potentially severe side-effects related to infections, blood disorders, and some-
times also cancer and heart failure.
The anti-TNF drugs were introduced on the US market by the end of 1998. The first
anti-TNF brand to receive marketing authorisation in Europe was Remicade (infliximab),
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which was approved for treatment of patients with Crohn’s disease – a fairly rare disease –
in August 1999 by the European Medicines Agency (EMA). The second anti-TNF brand on
the European market was Enbrel (etanercept), which got a marketing approval in February
2000 for rheumatoid arthritis, which is a much more frequent disease than Crohn’s disease.
Remicade was also approved for rheumatoid arthritis by the EMA just a couple of months
later in June 2000. The third entrant on the anti-TNF market was Humira (adalimumab).
In Europe, Humira got its first marketing approval in September 2003 for treatment of
rheumatoid arthritis.9
In Table 1 below we provide an overview of the marketing authorizations by the EMA
for the anti-TNF drugs considered in this study.
[ Table 1 about here ]
We see that the three anti-TNF drugs cover in total seven indications. Notably, the
indication approvals are not completely overlapping for the three drugs. Remicade is not
approved for juvenile rheumatoid arthritis, Enbrel is not approved for Crohn’s disease and
ulcerative colitis, and Humira is not approved for ulcerative colitis. We also see that the
approvals were given at different dates to the anti-TNF drugs. For instance, Remicade
was the only anti-TNF drug that could be used on patients with Crohn’s disease until
2007 when Humira also got an approval for treatment of this disease.
The set of marketing approvals will, of course, affect the consumption of the anti-TNF
drugs. The magnitude of the effect on consumption is likely to be influenced by the number
of approvals and the prevalence of the disease for which the drug is approved for in the
population. Some diseases are rare, such as Crohn’s disease, while others are much more
prevalent, such as rheumatoid arthritis. In the empirical analysis, we will make use of the
information on indication approvals when studying the consumption of anti-TNF drugs
9There are now more anti-TNF drugs on the market. Cimzia (certolizumab pegol) got marketing
authorization for rheumatoid arthritis in October 2009 by the EMA (but was refused for Crohn’s disease).
Simponi (golimumab) was also introduced in October 2009, and is approved for rheumatoid arthritis,
ankylosing spondylitis, and psoriatic arthritis.
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over time. However, the marketing authorizations by the EMA apply to all countries in
our sample, and will therefore not explain cross-country (but only cross-product) variation
in consumption.
Since the introduction of the anti-TNF drugs on the US market in 1998, the sales of
these drugs have increased tremendously. Over a decade, Remicade, Enbrel and Humira
have become global blockbusters. Their total sales revenues globally exceeded $20 billion in
2011. Humira generated the largest sales revenues of the three anti-TNF drugs with more
than $7.9 billion, followed by Enbrel and Remicade that produced global sales revenues
of $7.3 and $5.5 billion, respectively, in 2011.10 The sales are expected to increase even
further in the future, despite the entry of new competing products.
Biologics are often discovered and developed by smaller biotech firms that (if suc-
cessful) are acquired by the large pharmaceutical companies. This is also the case for
the anti-TNF drugs. Remicade was discovered by researchers at New York University
School of Medicine and developed by Centocor Biotech (now Janssen Biotech) – a sub-
sidary of Johnson&Johnson. Janssen Biotech is marketing Remicade in the US, while
Schering-Plough (now part of Merck) is marketing the drug elsewhere (except in some
Asian countries). Enbrel was discovered by researchers in the biotech company Immunex,
and is now marketed by Amgen in North America, and by Wyeth (a subsidary of Pfizer)
or Pfizer itself in the rest of the world (except in some Asian countries). Humira was
discovered through a collaboration between BASF Bioresearch and Cambridge Antibody
Technology, and then developed by BASF Pharma. This drug is now manufactured and
marketed by Abbott Laboratories after the acquisition of BASF Pharma by Abbott.
The three anti-TNF drugs are different biologics that vary in their treatment effect and
side-effects. Remicade (infliximab) and Humira (adalimumab) are artifical (monoclonal)
antibodies that binds and inhibits the action of TNF. Enbrel has a similar effect, but
is instead a fusion protein that function as a decoy receptor that binds to TNF. The
administration of these drugs differ. Remicade is given as an intravenous infusion under
the supervision of health care professionals at hospital or some other treatment facility.
10These figures are collected from the annual reports of Abbott, Merck, Amgen, and Pfizer for 2011.
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Enbrel and Humira, however, can be injected by the patient themselves at home. The
treatment intensity is higher for Enbrel and Humira than for Remicade. While the latter
only requires about 6 treatments per year, patients would need to take Enbrel and Humira
once or twice per week. In the empirical analysis we will take into account the differences
in product characteristics when analysing the consumption of the anti-TNF drugs.
The anti-TNF drugs are generally prescribed by hospital specialists or specialists out-
side hospitals (rheumatologists, dermatologists, etc.). Primary-care doctors are usually
not allowed to prescribe these drugs. Due to the fact that Remicade needs to be injected
under the supervision of health care professionals, this drug is almost exclusively prescribed
by hospital specialists and dispensed through hospitals. However, Enbrel and Humira are
prescribed by both hospital and non-hospital specialists, and dispensed through either
hospitals or retail pharmacies. Table 2 below offers an overview of the prescribers and
dispensing channels for the anti-TNF drugs in the countries in our sample, as well as the
funding body and level of copayments.
[ Table 2 about here ]
The anti-TNF drugs are very expensive medicines. As we see from the table, the
medical expenses are covered by health insurance with a (close to) 100 percent coverage.
Remicade, which is provided in hospitals, have no copayments, while consumers of Enbrel
and Humira are in some countries exposed to marginal copayments usually associated
with prescriptions outside hospitals. When it comes to the funding body, we notice that
there are some differences across the countries whether this is a public central or regional
government or private health insurance funds.
The countries in our study are Western European countries with fairly similar charac-
teristics along many dimensions such as demographics, health status, health care system,
income levels, educational levels, etc. However, there are also differences across these
countries, as can be seen from Table 2. The Scandinavian and Southern European coun-
tries have a National Health Service with predominantly public funding through general
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taxation and public provision of health care. However, we see that the funding body can
be either the central or regional government.11 The Continental countries have typically a
social insurance system with a mixture of public and private funding and provision. This
applies basically to Germany and Switzerland, but not France, as shown in Table 2.
There are also differences across the European countries when it comes to regulation
and price control schemes. Some countries make use of direct price control through price
cap regulation (Finland, Italy, Norway and Spain), where the price cap is usually based
on international price comparisons. Other countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden
and Switzerland) rely more on indirect price controls through negotiations with the phar-
maceutical companies or the design of reimbursement scheme, such as reference pricing
(interal referencing).12
Finally, the prevalence of diseases varies across countries (and also ethnicities). Epime-
diological studies tend to find that the prevalence of autoimmune diseases such as rheuma-
toid arthitis and psoriasis are substantially lower in Southern European countries com-
pared to Northern European countries.13 In the empirical analysis we will account for
such country-specific factors.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
We have obtained data from IMS Health14 containing detailed sales information of the
three leading anti-TNF brands (Remicade, Enbrel and Humira) in nine European countries
(Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland).
The data cover the ten year period from the launch of anti-TNF drugs on the European
market in 2000 up to 2009 when these drugs have become blockbusters in almost every
11The study by Dalen et al. (2012) on the reimbursement of anti-TNF drugs in Norway shows that the
choice of funding body (central government or public hospitals) has a significant effect on the pricing and
market shares of the anti-TNF brands.
12See, for instance, Danzon and Ketcham (2004), Pavcnik (2002), Brekke et al. (2009, 2011), and Dalen
et al. (2011) for studies of reference pricing and its effects on pricing and pharmaceutical expenditures.
13According to, for instance, Chandran and Raychaudhuri (2010) the prevalence of psoriasis in Europe
varies between 0.6 to 6.5 percent. Alamanos and Drosos (2005) report similar differences for rheumatoid
arthritis.
14IMS Health is a US-based market-research company that provides pharmaceutical and health care
information globally.
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Western country.
The data set contains detailed product-level data for each of the anti-TNF drugs in
each country, including monthly information about sales values and sales volumes for each
anti-TNF product (pack) on the national markets. Sales values are measured in local
currency at ex-manufacturer level, while sales volumes are measured as the number of
defined daily doses (DDDs)15 of each anti-TNF product (pack) sold in each country. The
data set also contains detailed information about manufacturer, product name, pack size,
dosage, and formulation. Hospital and retail sales are reported separately for all countries
except for Denmark and Sweden, where we have only the combined sales.
Based on the data set, we construct the following variables. First, we aggregate the
monthly sales volumes (the number of DDDs) of all packs with the same substance in
each country. This gives us a measure of the aggregate consumption per month of the
anti-TNF brands in the different countries. In order to compare the consumption levels
across countries, we normalize the monthly sales volumes by country population (per
10,000 inhabitants), so that we obtain the monthly per-capita consumption of the anti-
TNF drugs. Second, we compute the monthly (sales-weighted) average price per DDD for
each of the anti-TNF brands by dividing the sales value by the sales volumes (the number
of DDDs) of all packs with the same substance. For the countries with local currencies,
we convert these unit prices to Euros using contemporaneous monthly average exchange
rates. Finally, we compute the proportion of hospital sales and parallel imports relative
for total sales for each anti-TNF drug in each country. Table 3 below summarizes the
descriptive statistics.
[ Table 3 about here ]
3.1 Entry
As mentioned above, Remicade and Enbrel received their marketing authorization on the
European market by just before and after the year 2000, while Humira’s first approval
15Defined daily dose (DDD) is a dosage measure developed by the World Health Organization. This
measure is based on the assumed average daily maintenance dose for its main indication use in adults. The
DDDs are 3.75 mg for Remicade, 7 mg for Enbrel, and 2.9 mg for Humira.
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was in mid of 2003. The marketing approvals are EU wide and therefore applies to all
countries in our sample. However, the data reveal considerable variation in launch dates
across countries, especially for Enbrel, but also to some extent for Humira. We see from
Table 3 that Enbrel was launched in January 2000 in Norway, France and Switzerland, but
not before mid of 2003 in Denmark and Germany. Humira was first launched in Norway
in October 2002, while not before July 2004 in Italy.16 However, the launch of Remicade
is in the beginning of 2000 in all of the countries in our sample.
The launch of products on national markets is a strategic decision by the pharmaceu-
tical firms depending on the expected profits relative to the entry cost. If the expected
sales and prices are sufficiently high, entry will occure in a given market. In pharmaceu-
tical markets the launch decision is likely to be influenced by regulatory schemes, such as
the reimbursement and pricing of these drugs in the various countries.17 Clearly, delays
in launching of products will influence the diffusion of anti-TNF drugs, and might be a
source of cross-country differences in consumption of these products.
3.2 Consumption
If we consider the per-capita consumption of anti-TNF drugs, the figures in Table 3 show
considerable cross-country variation. We see that Germany and Italy have the lowest
(overall) consumption rates of anti-TNF drugs with almost 78 DDDs per 10,000 capita
per month on average over the period 2000-2009. Norway has, by far, the highest con-
sumption rate with 375.6 DDDs per 10,000 capita per month. This is more than four times
the consumption of Germany and Italy. Interestingly, there are large variations between
neighbouring countries. For instance, the consumption in Norway is 85 percent higher
than in Denmark, and the consumption in Spain is 77 percent higher than in Italy.
If we compare the consumption of the three anti-TNF drugs, we see that Remicade has
16Note that the first marketing approval of Humira by the EMA was in September 2003. The reason we
observe sales of Humira before that date in Norway is due to the fact that hospitals may start using these
drugs before the actual approval date.
17See, for instance, the studies by Danzon et al. (2005) and Kyle (2007) who find that countries with
strict price control have fewer launches of new drugs, and that pharmaceutical companies tend to delay
launch into price-controlled markets.
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the highest consumption rate (market share) in all countries except for Germany, where
Enbrel has a slightly higher level. The consumption rates of Enbrel and Humira vary
across countries. In Denmark, Finland, Germany and Switzerland, Humira has a higher
consumption level than Enbrel, wheras the opposite is true in the rest of the countries.
Since we have monthly data for the ten year period 2000-2009, we can study the
diffusion of the anti TNF drugs in the various countries. This also allows us to take a
closer look at how the late entry of Humira affects the sales of Enbrel and Remicade. The
figure below plots the monthly average consumption (in DDDs) per 10,000 capita for each
brand in each country.
[ Figure 1 about here ]
We see that the three anti-TNF brands have experienced a significant growth in con-
sumption in all countries. The consumption growth is particularly strong in the Scan-
dinavian countries. In almost every country, Remicade has the highest consumption per
capita throughout the period. Indeed, in Norway the monthly consumption of Remicade
per 10,000 inhabitant exceeds 300 DDDs by the end of 2009.
Interestingly, Humira quickly achieves a high consumption level after its late entry.
However, the consumption growth of Remicade and Enbrel continues in all countries.
This illustrates that the anti-TNF market is expanding over the period. Humira is not
just ”stealing” patients from Enbrel and Remicade, but also expands the market for anti-
TNF drugs. We will analyze the diffusion of anti-TNF drugs more carefully in Section 4,
but first we take a closer look at the pricing of these products in the different countries.
3.3 Pricing
The anti-TNF drugs are very expensive. In Table 3 we report the average price per DDD
for each product in each country. We see that the average price of Remicade is considerably
lower than Enbrel and Humira in all countries. In many countries Remicade is almost 50
percent cheaper than Enbrel and Humira. The average price of Enbrel and Humira are
almost the same in most countries, except for in Germany, France and Spain where Humira
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has a slightly higher average price.
The price variation across brands is likely to be due to differences in product char-
acteristics. The three anti-TNF brands differ in their treatment efficacy and side-effects,
as well as the set of indications that they are approved for. Importantly, these drugs
also differ in the administration. Remicade requires injections administrated by health
personnel usually at hospital facilities, while Enbrel and Humira can be administrated by
the patients themselves at home. This can be one reason for the lower price on Remicade
compared to Enbrel and Humira.
More interestingly, we observe that there are considerable price differences across coun-
tries for the same product. For instance, the average price per DDD of Humira varies from
e 34.36 in Italy to e 52.82 in Germany. The average price of Enbrel also differ consider-
ably, while cross-country price variation of Remicade is much smaller. Germany tends to
be the high-price country. This is also consistent with the fact that we observe parallel
imports for this country only, with the exception of Enbrel in Sweden. Italy, on the other
hand, tends to be the low-price country.
Let us also take a look at the development in prices over time. Figure 1 below reports
the monthly average price per DDD (in Euros) for each of the anti-TNF brands in each
country over the period 2000-2009.
[ Figure 2 about here ]
We see that the prices are fairly stable in most countries. The figure confirms that
Remicade is priced lower than the two competing anti-TNF brands in every country. We
also see that Humira enters the market with a price equal to or sometimes even higher
than Enbrel. This pricing strategy reflects that Humira is perceived to be of same quality
than Enbrel, but of higher quality than Remicade.
How do the pricing of Remicade and Enbrel respond to the entry of Humira? In
Denmark and Italy we cannot spot any price responses. In Finland and Norway there
seem to be some price reductions (competition) taking place after the entry of Humira,
12
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while, in France and Germany, the price of Enbrel is in fact increasing after the entry.
The price of Humira is gradually reduced, and the two prices eventually converge in these
two countries.
As mentioned in the previous section, the prices of the anti-TNF drugs are not set freely
by the pharmaceutical firms, but are subject to price control mechanisms or negotiations
with payers in the different countries. Thus, price changes can be induced by regulations
or through re-negotiations. This is also likely to explain parts of the differences in price
levels and developments across countries. However, pharmaceutical companies can also
make (especially downwards) adjustments of the pricing of their products. In any case,
the prices of the anti-TNF drugs are likely to influence the diffusion, which will be taken
into account in the empirical analysis in the next section.18
4 Empirical method
We now proceed by analyzing the potential sources of cross-country variation in the con-
sumption of the anti-TNF drugs. Since we have a product-level panel data set with
detailed sales information of the three anti-TNF brands over ten years (120 months) in
nine countries, we are able to control for all product- and country-specific factors (both
observed and unobserved) that are time invariant. We estimate the following multivariate
regression model:19
lnYcit = β1 lnPcit + β2 lnGDPct + β3HEct + β4Iit (1)
+αi + γc + δ ln t+ εcit,
where the dependent variable (lnYcit) is the (natural logarithm of) consumption per
(10,000) capita of product i in country c at time t. In the regression we include dummy
18The study by Desiraju et al. (2004) shows that the diffusion speed is lower in countries with high prices.
However, we may also expect that high price levels imply quicker launch (less delay) of new products, as
found by Kyle (2007).
19All variables are measured at a monthly basis except for gross domestic product (GDP ) and health
expenditures (HE) that are measured on a yearly basis.
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variables to capture product- and country-specific effects. The product-specific dummies
(αi) capture characteristics of the anti-TNF drugs that are constant over time and com-
mon across countries. The different brands are separate biological substances with different
properties in treatment. One brand might be more effective in treating some patients (or
diseases), while less effective for others. The brands also differ in their side-effects, and
for this reason could be more suitable for some patients (or diseases), while less suitable
for others. The product-specific effects also include properties of the drug treatment like
the fact that the use of Remicade requires assistance by health personnel, whereas Enbrel
and Humira can be administrated by the patients themselves at home. In the regressions
we use Remicade as the reference product.20
The country-specific dummies (γc) capture all characteristics of national markets that
are constant over time and common across the products, such as market (or population)
size, health status of population (mortality and morbidity), health care system (public
or private), funding schemes, etc. Importantly, the country-fixed effects also capture the
prevalence of diseases that are relevant for treatment with anti-TNF drugs. For instance,
the share of the population with rheumatism is likely to vary across countries, but not
over time within a country. Norway is used as the reference country in the regressions.
The descriptive statistics show that the consumption of anti-TNF drugs increases over
time in all countries in our sample. To account for this, we include a time trend (ln t) in
the regression. In this way we control for time variations in the consumption of anti-TNF
drugs that are common across countries and brands.
The regression model also includes a set of explanatory variables. First, we include the
(natural logarithm of) average price per DDD (lnPcit) of product i in country c at time t.
We expect the consumption to decrease in price, but the correlation might be weak due to
the presence of health insurance. As shown in Table 2, the copayments for anti-TNF drugs
are either zero or very marginal relative to the treatment cost. Patients are therefore not
20Product characteristics that vary over time and are correlated with our explanatory variables can
generate an endogeneity problem and lead to biased estimates. For instance, marketing effort may affect
perceived product quality, which is likely to affect sales and prices in most markets. However, prices of
anti-TNF drugs are regulated in most European countries, which implies that this kind of endogenity
problem is less severe in our study.
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very likely to respond much to price changes. However, the payer may impose cost-sharing
incentives on the providers (hospitals or specialists), such as allocation of fixed budgets,
to induce price responsiveness in the utilization of anti-TNF drugs.21 Moreover, the payer
may engage in negotiations with the pharmaceutical firms or regulate the price directly.
Since we estimate the effect of price and not copayment on consumption, our demand
elasticity measure includes both patient and provider/payer responses.
Our estimate on the price elasticity can, however, be biased due to the standard
endogeneity problem related to prices and demand being determined simultaneously. On
one hand, higher prices are expected to reduce demand, all else equal. On the other
hand, higher demand implies that firms can profitably increase their prices. The estimate
of the price effect on consumption of anti-TNF drugs is therefore likely to be downward
biased. However, endogenity is not a crucial problem in our case, since the anti-TNF drug
market is expanding during the period and pharmaceutical firms face restrictions on price
increases due to regulation.
Second, we use (the natural logarithm of) GDP per (10,000) capita (lnGDPct) for
each country per year. GDP per capita is a measure of the average income level in each
country. We expect a positive correlation between income and consumption of anti-TNF
drugs, but the income elasticity of demand might be weak due to the presence of health
insurance. On the other hand, the financing of expensive medicines, such as anti-TNF
drugs, might be more generous in ”richer” countries, i.e., countries with higher GPD per
capita. Table 4 reports the annual averages of the GPD per capita variable. We see that
GDP per capita varies both over time and across countries.
[ Table 4 about here ]
Third, we control for health expenditures by including a variable (HEct) measuring the
21A recent study by Dalen et al. (2012) finds that a change in the financing of anti-TNF drugs from cen-
tral government (social insurance agency) to public hospital enterprises induced a shift in the consumption
from the higher-priced Enbrel to the lower-priced Remicade. They argue this is due to the funding being
based on a fixed hospital budget rather than regular social insurance payments with no expenditure caps.
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total spending on health as a percentage of GDP in each country per year. It is reasonable
to expect a positive correlation between total health expenditures and the consumption
of anti-TNF drugs.22 Countries that spend much on health in general are more likely to
also spend more on anti-TNF drugs, which in turn would lead to a higher consumption of
these drugs. Table 4 shows that there is also variation in health expenditures over time
and across countries.
Fourth, we include a variable (Iit) that measures the number of indications each of the
anti-TNF drugs are approved for by the European Medicines Agency (EMA) per period
(month). The set of approved indications is a measure of market size. We expect a positive
correlation between the number of approved indications and the consumption of anti-TNF
drugs. The indication variable varies across products and over time, but is common across
countries, since the EMA approvals apply to all countries in our sample. In Table 4 we
report the number of approved indications for each product by end of year.23
Finally, the regression model includes an error term (εcit) that represents unobserved,
time-varying factors that affect the consumption of anti-TNF drugs in the different coun-
tries. The explanatory variables are allowed to be correlated with the product- and
country-specific effects, but not with error term.
5 Results
Table 5 below reports the results from the regressions.24 To better understand the impact
of the different explanatory variables, we start out with estimating a model including only
country-specific effects, product-specific effects, and a time trend (model 1). Consistent
with the descriptive statistics, the regression results show large cross-country variation in
consumption of anti-TNF drugs. The consumption of anti-TNF drugs tends to be higher
in the Nordic countries. Norway, which is the base country, has the highest consumption
22The anti-TNF drug expenditures are of course a part of the overall health expenditures, but the share
is negible, so including health expenditures as an explanatory variable should not involve any endogeneity
problems.
23See Table 1 for which diseases the three anti-TNF drugs are approved for at what time.
24The reason we have 2744 observations over 120 months (and not 3240) is that all three anti-TNF
brands are not present in every period in every country, as can be seen from Table 3 (see also Section 3.1).
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level among the countries in our sample. The per-capita consumption in Norway is 173
percent higher than in Italy, which has the lowest consumption level. However, compared
with the descriptive statistics, the magnitude of the cross-country variation is substantially
reduced. Indeed, country-specific time-invariant factors, such as disease prevalence, health
care system, health status, etc., account for about half of the cross-country variation in
per-capita consumption.
The results also show systematic differences in per-capita consumption across the three
anti-TNF brands. We see that Remicade has a substantially higher market share than
Enbrel and Humira. In model 1 the per-capita consumption of Remicade is estimated to
be 74 and 102 percent higher than Enbrel and Humira, respectively. These are the average
figures across all countries. The results also show a positive time trend, which is consistent
with the descriptive statistics reported in the previous section.
[ Table 5 about here ]
Despite the fact that country-specific effects explain a substantial share of the cross-
country variation in consumption of anti-TNF drugs, there is still large unexplained vari-
ation even between neighbouring countries. Within the Nordic countries, Denmark has 63
percent and Sweden 14.4 percent lower consumption than Norway. The same observation
applies to Southern Europe, where Italy has 60 percent higher consumption of anti-TNF
drugs than Spain.
To study the remaining cross-country variation in the diffusion of anti-TNF drugs, we
successively introduce the explanatory variables in the regression analysis. In model 2 we
include prices and the number indication approvals. The results show that both variables
have the expected effects. We estimate a price elasticity of −0.45, which means that
consumption of anti-TNF drugs is fairly inelastic.25 Since copayments of anti-TNF drugs
are close to zero, patients are not likely to respond much to price changes. The demand
25This estimate is perhaps somewhat high compared to more recent studies. For instance, Contoyannis
et al. (2005), who use a policy experiment in Canada, report price elasticities in the range of -0.12 to -0.16.
However, these studies estimate the effect of patients’ copayment (and not the full price) on consumption.
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elasticity is more likely due to payers imposing cost-containment incentives on providers,
such as allocation of fixed budgets, or directly regulating or negotiating prices with the
pharmaceutical companies.26 A general problem when estimating price elasticities is that
the estimates might be biased due to entry (or exit) of products. In our case Enbrel and
particularly Humira enter national markets later than Remicade. Thus, the price elasticity
estimate must be interpreted with some caution.
The effect of indication approvals on consumption is as expected. One extra approval
increases the average per-capita consumption of anti-TNF drugs with almost 27 percent
on average. Thus, increasing the set of approved indications is crucial for the diffusion of
anti-TNF drugs, and is important in explaining the growth in consumption of these drugs.
Although we find that prices and indication approvals have significant effects on the
consumption levels of anti-TNF drugs, the cross-country differences change only marginally
when we include these variables in the regression analysis. The number of indication ap-
provals vary across products, but are common to all countries, and are therefore not likely
to influence the cross-country differences in consumption of anti-TNF drugs. Moreover, we
observe from the descriptive statistics in Table 3 that the cross-country variation in prices
of the anti-TNF brands is fairly low, which suggests that including prices in the regressions
should not contribute much to explaining the cross-country variation in consumption.
Finally, in model 3, we include income (GDP per capita) and health expenditures
(health spending as a percentage of GDP) in the regression analysis. Both variables have
the expected effects. The income elasticity is 0.9, which seems reasonable due to the
presence of health insurance. The results also show that one percentage point increase in
the health expenditures (relative to GDP) increases the consumption of anti-TNF drugs
by 11.1 percent on average.
More interestingly, the results show that the inclusion of income and health expen-
ditures in the regression analysis has a significant effect on the estimated cross-country
differences in the consumption of anti-TNF drugs. With the exception of Switzerland,
controlling for income and health expenditures reduces the cross-country variation in con-
26See, for instance, Dalen et al. (2012) who offer some empirical evidence on this issue.
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sumption. The magnitude of these reductions vary across countries. For some countries,
such as Spain, Italy and Finland, the estimated consumption differences relative to Nor-
way become substantially smaller. We also see that Sweden in fact has a higher con-
sumption than Norway when controlling for income and health expenditures. For other
countries, such as France and Germany, the reduction in the estimated consumption is
more marginal. These findings are consistent with the cross-country variation in income
and health expenditures, as reported in Table 4.
However, there are still considerable differences in consumption of anti-TNF drugs
across countries, as reflected by the country dummy variables in model 3. In particular,
Germany, Switzerland and Italy have substantially lower consumption than Norway even
after controlling prices, income and health expenditures. There might be many country-
specific (time-invariant) factors that can explain the residual cross-country differences.
One such factor could be the prevalence of diseases subject to medical treatment by anti-
TNF drugs. As mentioned above, rheumatism and psoriasis tend to be less frequent in
Southern European countries. This could partly explain why Italy has a low consumption
level, but does not explain the large difference between Italy and Spain. The same argu-
ment applies to other neighbouring countries, such as Denmark and Norway, that have
significant differences in the per-capita consumption of anti-TNF drugs.
Another possible source for the observed cross-country variation in the diffusion of
anti-TNF drugs can be the differences in the funding schemes. The countries in our
sample vary according to whether the pharmaceutical expenditures are financed through
taxation or social insurance contributions. They also vary according to whether insurance
is provided publicly (by the state) or privately. The results show that there is a tendency
that countries with social insurance schemes and private provision, such as Germany and
Switzerland, have a lower consumption of anti-TNF drugs than countries that base the
funding on taxation, with the exception of Italy.27
There are also differences according to the regulatory schemes. The strictness in the
27Unfortunately, we do not have information on (changes in) funding schemes over time within a country.
This information would have made it possible to test the importance of funding schemes for the diffusion
of anti-TNF drugs.
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price control should be captured by the price variable included in the regression analysis
(model 2 and 3). However, there are other regulatory instruments that may affect the
diffusion of new medicines, such as the criteria for inclusion on the reimbursement list,
medical guidelines, or other measures that influence the utilization of anti-TNF drugs.
Such information is hard to obtain for specific drug therapies. However, if the regulatory
schemes are fairly constant over time, the country-specific effects should capture the impact
of different schemes.
6 Concluding remarks
Diffusion of new medicines is important for pharmaceutical firms’ profits, but also for
patients’ access to new medical treatments. In this paper we have studied the cross-country
diffusion of anti-TNF drugs across a set of European countries from the first launch in
2000 until becoming blockbusters in 2009. To examine the cross-country consumption
patterns, we use of a data set with detailed product-level information about the sales of
the three anti-TNF brands Remicade, Enbrel and Humira.
The descriptive statistics show substantial growth in the per-capita consumption of the
anti-TNF drugs in all countries over the sample period, but reveal also very large variation
across countries. Interestingly, the consumption differences between neighbouring coun-
tries, such as Spain and Italy or Norway and Denmark, are large. In order to explore the
sources of the cross-country variation in the consumption of anti-TNF drugs, we estimate
several multivariate regression models. We find that time-invariant country-specific fac-
tors (e.g., disease prevalence, demographics, health care system, etc.) explain substantial
parts of the cross-country variation in consumption, but the residual differences are still
large.
We therefore successively introduce sets of explanatory variables. First, we include
prices and the number of approved indications for each of the three anti-TNF drugs in
the different countries. Both variables have the expected effects on the per-capita con-
sumption, but do not influence the cross-country differences in consumption. Second,
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we include income (GDP per capita) and health expenditures (as a percentage of GDP)
as explanatory variables. These variables influence the cross-country differences. With
the exception of Switzerland, controlling for income and health expenditures lead to a
reduction in the differences in per-capita consumption across countries. The remaining
cross-country variation is therefore likely to be explained by unobserved factors that might
have been changing over time, such as, for instance, medical guidelines, funding schemes,
or marketing strategies by the pharmaceutical firms. We leave these issues to future
research.
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Indication approvals and marketing authorizations for anti-TNF drugs by EMA. 
 
Indications 
Date of issue of marketing authorization 
Remicade 
(infliximab) 
Enbrel 
(etanercept) 
Humira 
(adalimumab) 
Crohn’s disease 13 August 1999 - 4 June 2007 
Rheumatoid arthritis 27 June 2000 3 February 2000 8 September 2003 
Ankylosing spondylitis 15 May 2003 16 January 2004 1 June 2006 
Psoriatic arthritis 24 September 2004 5 December 2002 1 August 2005 
Plaque psoriasis 29 September 2005 24 September 2004 19 December 2007 
Ulcerative colitis 28 February 2006 - - 
Juvenile idiopathic arthritis - 3 February 2000 25 August 2008 
 
Table
Table 2. Prescriptions, dispending channels and funding of anti-TNF drugs across countries, 2010 (IMS Health). 
 Anti-TNF drug Prescribers Dispensing channels Funding Copayment 
Denmark Remicade Hospital specialists Hospitals Regional government funds No 
 Enbrel Community dermatologists Hospitals and pharmacies Regional government funds Marginal (<1%) 
 Humira Community dermatologists Hospitals and pharmacies Regional government funds Marginal (<1%) 
Finland Remicade Hospital specialists Hospitals Central government (social 
insurance institute) 
No 
 Enbrel Rheumatologists Pharmacies Central government (social 
insurance institute) 
Marginal (4%) 
 Humira Rheumatologists Pharmacies Central government (social 
insurance institute) 
Marginal (4%) 
France Remicade Hospital specialists Hospitals National Health Service No 
 Enbrel Private specialists Pharmacies National Health Service No 
 Humira Private specialists Pharmacies National Health Service No 
Germany Remicade Hospitals and private specialists Hospitals and pharmacies Health insurance organizations 
and private insurance funds 
No 
 Enbrel Hospitals and private specialists Pharmacies Health insurance organizations 
and private insurance funds 
No 
 Humira Hospitals and private specialists Pharmacies Health insurance organizations 
and private insurance funds 
No 
Italy Remicade Hospital specialists Hospitals Regional government with 
national subsidy 
No 
 Enbrel Hospital specialists Hospitals and pharmacies Regional government with 
national subsidy 
No 
 Humira Hospital specialists Hospitals and pharmacies Regional government with 
national subsidy 
No 
Norway Remicade Hospital specialists Hospitals Central government No 
 Enbrel Hospital and private specialists Hospitals and pharmacies Central government No 
 Humira Hospital and private specialists Hospitals and pharmacies Central government No 
Spain Remicade Hospital specialists Hospitals Central government No 
 Enbrel Hospital specialists Hospitals Central government No 
 Humira Hospital specialists Hospitals Central government No 
Sweden Remicade Hospital specialists Hospitals and pharmacies Regional government with 
national subsidy 
No 
 Enbrel Hospital specialists Hospitals and pharmacies Regional government with 
national subsidy 
Marginal (<1%) 
 Humira Hospital specialists Hospitals and pharmacies Regional government with 
national subsidy 
Marginal (<1%) 
Switzerland Remicade Hospital and private specialists Hospital, pharmacy and self-
dispensing doctors 
Health insurance funds Marginal  
 Enbrel Hospitals and private specialists Hospital, pharmacy and self-
dispensing doctors 
Health insurance funds Marginal 
 Humira Hospitals and private specialists Hospital, pharmacy and self-
dispensing doctors 
Health insurance funds Marginal 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics. 
Country  Molecule Drug In the data 
set 
Average price 
(national 
currency) 
Average price 
(EURO) 
Average  DDD 
per month 
Average DDD per 1000 
inhabitants (per 
month) 
Proportion 
hospital sales 
Proportion 
parallel 
import 
Norway (hospital and retail data) INFLIXIMAB REMICADE Jan 2000 156.63 19.37 76715.77 164.29 0.76 0 
ADALIMUMAB HUMIRA Oct 2002 297.59 36.59 34582.32 73.53 0.02 0 
ETANERCEPT ENBREL Jan 2000 295.77 36.63 64286.31 137.78 0.01 0 
  ALL DRUGS - 245.66 30.40 166074.30 355.38 0.29 0 
Sweden (combined data only) INFLIXIMAB REMICADE Jan 2000 185.72 19.96 125377.80 138.34 - 0 
ADALIMUMAB HUMIRA Sep 2003 382.66 40.41 61073.32 66.82 - 0 
ETANERCEPT ENBREL May 2000 368.67 39.58 81710.46 89.82 - 0.01 
  ALL DRUGS - 295.05 31.68 243044.30 267.48 - 0.003 
Denmark (combined data only) INFLIXIMAB REMICADE Jan 2000 156.68 21.04 56063.78 102.93 - 0 
ADALIMUMAB HUMIRA Oct 2003 319.31 42.86 39790.71 72.78 - 0 
ETANERCEPT ENBREL Jul 2003 308.26 41.38 36438.28 66.75 - 0 
  ALL DRUGS - 222.96 29.94 104617.80 191.80 - 0 
Finland (hospital and retail data) INFLIXIMAB REMICADE Jan 2000 20.62 20.62 41948.44 79.74 1.00 0 
ADALIMUMAB HUMIRA Mar 2004 38.71 38.71 37808.08 71.51 0.03 0 
ETANERCEPT ENBREL Jun 2000 39.13 39.13 26413.42 50.05 0.29 0 
  ALL DRUGS - 31.24 31.24 89316.01 169.42 0.51 0 
Germany (hospital and retail data) 
 
INFLIXIMAB REMICADE Jan 2000 22.48 22.48 238780.93 29.01 0.24 0.05 
ADALIMUMAB HUMIRA Sep 2003 52.82 52.82 269399.60 32.77 0.01 0.10 
ETANERCEPT ENBREL May 2003 46.78 46.78 242120.43 29.42 0.01 0.10 
  ALL DRUGS - 37.65 37.65 641432.70 77.96 0.10 0.08 
France (hospital and retail data) 
 
INFLIXIMAB REMICADE Jan 2000 24.26 24.26 384132.40 60.65 1.00 0 
ADALIMUMAB HUMIRA Jul 2003 41.74 41.74 219419.11 34.43 0.29 0 
ETANERCEPT ENBREL Jan 2000 32.91 32.91 227589.25 35.87 0.37 0 
  ALL DRUGS - 31.40 31.40 754344.40 118.90 0.59 0 
Spain (hospital and retail data) INFLIXIMAB REMICADE Jan 2000 20.82 20.82 277832.93 63.15 1.00 0 
ADALIMUMAB HUMIRA Mar 2004 37.53 37.53 189223.02 42.13 1.00 0 
ETANERCEPT ENBREL Apr 2001 33.41 33.41 258574.59 57.77 0.91 0 
  ALL DRUGS - 28.52 28.52 614465.70 138.29 0.97 0 
Italy (hospital and retail data) 
 
INFLIXIMAB REMICADE Apr 2000 18.26 18.26 232429.55 39.43 1.00 0 
ADALIMUMAB HUMIRA Jul 2004 34.36 34.36 141886.17 23.88 1.00 0 
ETANERCEPT ENBREL May 2001 34.51 34.51 180303.32 30.43 1.00 0 
  ALL DRUGS - 27.15 27.15 460918.90 77.95 1.00 0 
Switzerland (hospital and retail 
data) 
INFLIXIMAB REMICADE Mar 2000 36.54 23.70 54417.17 72.38 0.84 0 
ADALIMUMAB HUMIRA Jul 2003 59.88 38.26 38921.66 51.46 0.08 0 
ETANERCEPT ENBREL Jan 2000 57.56 37.29 22415.71 29.77 0.32 0 
  ALL DRUGS - 50.03 32.38 101225.00 134.39 0.45 0 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics per year. Number of indications, GDP per capita (US dollars) and health spending as percentage of GDP 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Number of 
indications 
(measured at 
the end of each 
year) 
Remicade 2 2 3 3 4 5 6 6 6 6 
Enbrel 2 2 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Humira 0 0 0 1 1 2 3 5 6 6 
Norway.  
 
GDP per capita 
Health spending as percentage of GDP 
35860 
8.4 
37530 
8.8 
39200 
9.8 
40010 
10.0 
53200 
9.7 
62760 
9.1 
68830 
8.6 
76950 
8.9 
85580 
8.6 
86130 
9.6 
Sweden  GDP per capita 
Health spending as percentage of GDP 
29490 
8.2 
27670 
8.9 
27190 
9.2 
30680 
9.3 
37190 
9.3 
42920 
9.1 
45680 
8.9 
48900 
8.9 
52390 
9.2 
48830 
10.0 
Denmark  GDP per capita 
Health spending as percentage of GDP 
31830 
8.7 
30620 
9.1 
30060 
9.3 
33940 
9.5 
41560 
9.7 
48590 
9.8 
52250 
9.9 
54700 
10.0 
59040 
10.3 
58350 
11.5 
Finland  GDP per capita 
Health spending as percentage of GDP 
25440 
7.2 
24810 
7.4 
24660 
7.8 
27640 
8.2 
33980 
8.2 
38550 
8.4 
41130 
8.4 
44200 
8.1 
47960 
8.4 
46540 
9.2 
Germany  GDP per capita 
Health spending as percentage of GDP 
25300 
10.3 
23870 
10.4 
22850 
10.6 
25400 
10.8 
30750  
10.6 
34780 
10.7 
37210 
10.6 
39440 
10.5 
42470 
10.7 
42540 
11.6 
France  GDP per capita 
Health spending as percentage of GDP 
24270 
10.1 
23080 
10.2 
22330 
10.5 
25130 
10.9 
30420 
11.0 
34850 
11.1 
36760 
11.0 
38900 
11.0 
41940 
11.1 
42390 
11.8 
Italy  GDP per capita 
Health spending as percentage of GDP 
21010 
8.1 
20310 
8.2 
19910 
8.3 
22310 
8.3 
26980 
8.7 
30880 
8.9 
32560 
9.0 
34030 
8.7 
35760 
9.0 
35570 
9.5 
Spain  GDP per capita 
Health spending as percentage of GDP 
15420 
7.2 
15060 
7.2 
15120 
7.3 
17570 
8.2 
21590 
8.2 
25450 
8.3 
27490 
8.4 
29400 
8.5 
31850 
9.0 
32140 
9.5 
Switzerland  GDP per capita 
Health spending as percentage of GDP 
41160 
10.2 
38690 
10.6 
36670 
10.9 
43480 
11.3 
51290 
11.3 
58530 
11.2 
60610 
10.8 
59040 
10.6 
59340 
10.7 
66630 
11.4 
Data source: GNP: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD. Health spending: http://www.oecd.org/health/ 
Table 5. Regression results, consumption of anti-TNF drugs (DDD per 10,000 capita). 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Number of indication approvals - 0.268*** (0.013) 0.193*** (0.011) 
Ln price - -0.445*** (0.135) -0.328*** (0.130) 
Ln GDP per capita - - 0.896*** (0.126) 
Ln health spending as percentage of GDP - - 0.111*** (0.027) 
Base: Remicade    
Enbrel -0.742*** (0.027) -0.534*** (0.080) -0.583*** (0.078) 
Humira -1.024*** (0.028) -0.404*** (0.088) -0. 497*** (0.083) 
Base: Norway    
France -1.210*** (0.048) -1.189*** (0.046) -0.968*** (0.101) 
Sweden -0.144*** (0.050) -0.124*** (0.049) 0.230** (0.074) 
Denmark -0.630*** (0.047) -0.601*** (0.047) -0.460*** (0.066) 
Finland -0.777*** (0.052) -0.764*** (0.049) -0.221*** (0.087) 
Germany -1.497*** (0.046) -1.398*** (0.059) -1.177*** (0.108) 
Italy -1.731*** (0.055) -1.765*** (0.050) -1.039*** (0.118) 
Spain -1.137*** (0.054) -1.145*** (0.048) -0.221* (0.129) 
Switzerland -1.211*** (0.052) -1.177*** (0.054) -1.256*** (0.079) 
Time trend (ln period) 1.209*** (0.029) 0.782*** (0.036) 0.629*** (0.049) 
Constant 0.273** (0.128) 2.280*** (0.411) 0.228 (0.455) 
R2 0.772 0.821 0.823 
Observations 2744 2744 2744 
***: significant at the 1% level, **: significant at the 5% level, *: significant at the 10% level, 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Consumption levels in DDD per capita. 
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Figure 2. Prices per DDD in Euros.  
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Response to Reviewer 1 
We are grateful for your careful review of our paper. Below we explain how we have dealt with your 
comments and suggestions as they appeared in your report. The reply is in bold text.  
1) Entry. Remicade and Enbrel entered the market around year 2000, while Humira entered  the 
market in 2003. Is entry affected by some of the explanatory variables in the regression? If yes, the 
estimates of the regression might be biased. This is a relevant comment. The time of entry is 
mainly related to the time of the discovery of a new medicine. This applies to the anti-TNF drugs, 
where Humira was discovered later than Remicade and Enbrel. However, the launch in national 
markets might be delayed if entry cost is higher than the expected profits. In our data we observe 
launch delay for Enbrel and Humira in some countries. We cannot rule out that the launch delay 
is correlated with some of our explanatory variables, such as the price variable. Entry (or exit) of 
products (brands) is a general problem for most empirical studies measuring price effects on 
consumption (or demand elasticities). To deal with this issue, one needs an instrument that 
affects prices but not consumption. This is hard to obtain and beyond the scope of our study. The 
fact most countries regulate prices may reduce the concern about biased price estimates, but 
since we cannot rule this out, we now explicitly mention the potential problem related to 
correlation between entry and price on page 18. 
 
2) Price is one of the explanatory variables. In many markets unobserved characteristics (here say, 
side effects) are priced out in the market. If this is the case here, then the error term and/or the 
product-specific effects may be correlated with price. A statistical check on this should be included 
in the paper. Time invariant unobserved characteristics, such as side-effects, are capture by the 
product-specific dummies. Correlation between the product-specific dummies and the price 
variable is allowed in our specification, and should not lead to biased estimates. However, 
correlation between the error term and the price variable can be problematic. We are not aware 
of any statistical test for checking this (endogeneity) problem besides the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test, but then we need a valid instrument, which hard to find in our case. On the other hand, the 
endogeneity problem might be less severe in our case, since prices are regulated in most of the 
countries in our sample. We now comment on this potential problem in footnote 20 on page 14. 
Moreover, and discussed at some length in the paper, the funding scheme of the drugs vary across 
countries and time. These varying funding schemes may affect the impact of price on total 
consumption and market shares. One way of dealing with this is to interact price with dummies 
reflecting types of funding schemes. Unfortunately, we do not have information about (changes 
in) funding schemes over time within a given country. Thus, it is not possible to identify the effect 
of funding schemes in our model with country-specific effects. We could drop the country-
specific dummies and instead use dummies for funding scheme, which in turn could be interacted 
with price. We have run such a model, but the results do not appear reasonable. Moreover, we 
do not think it is a good idea to ignore the country-specific effects, as this would most likely 
introduce a strong endogeneity problem. Using only dummies for funding schemes implies that 
we assume that countries like Norway and Spain (with a central government funding) are similar 
and do not vary according to unobserved characteristics. An alternative approach is to interact 
the price variable with the country-specific dummies. The results, which are reported in the table 
below, indicate no tendency for countries with similar funding scheme to have similar price 
effects. We do not think this is very surprising since the countries with similar funding schemes 
are likely to differ in other important dimensions that may influence the consumption. We have 
Authors' Response to Reviewers' Comments
Click here to download Authors' Response to Reviewers' Comments: Response_Reviewer1.docx 
therefore decided to not include this in the paper (unless you think otherwise). However, we 
offer a brief discussion of this issue on page 19 and footnote 27.  
 
3) It is mentioned in the paper that the error terms in the regression are allowed to be correlated with 
the product- and country specific dummies. No specification of this possible correlation nor 
empirical results are shown. Clearly, this was an incorrect statement. What we meant was that 
the explanatory variables are allowed to be correlated with the product- and country-specific 
effects, but not with the error term. This has now been corrected (see page 16).   
 
4) GDP per capita and total health expenditure relative to GDP are among the explanatory variables. 
These two variables vary across years, while the left hand side variables in the regression vary 
across months. This is ok, but because a country specific dummy is among the explanatory variables 
these dummies could be correlated with GDP and total health expenditure relative to GDP. The 
reason why is that the few years of observations of GDP and health expenditure across countries 
may function as sort of country dummies in an observation set which otherwise is on a monthly 
basis. We would be worried about this if GDP and HE were fairly time invariant. However, this is 
not the case. We have produced a new table (Table 4) where we report GDP and HE per year. As 
the table shows, there is considerable variation over time in both variables within each country. 
In the regressions we utilize only within country variation of the explanatory variables, and find 
that GDP and HE have significant effects on per-capita consumption. Thus, we do not think this is 
a major problem in our paper. In the revised version we now include Table 4 and comment on 
the variation in these two variables (see page 15-16).  
 
5) The results make sense (there is a misprint on page 17, the income elasticity is +0.96, not -0.96), 
although I find the price elasticity to be on the rather high side, given the fact that the agent pays a 
rather small fraction of the price. So, what is the interpretation of the price coefficient: Is it related 
to the response among patient, or is it a result of a bargaining between the authorities and the 
pharmaceutical firms, or is it due to switching over time between the three drugs? We agree that 
the price elasticity may be on the high side. However, most of the previous studies focus on the 
demand responses to changes in copayments (consumer price) rather than the full price 
(producer price). Since the copayments for anti-TNF drugs are really small (compared to the full 
price), we think the price elasticity is mainly driven by cost containment incentives imposed by 
the payers on the providers (hospitals or specialists). It can also be due to negotiations or 
regulation. We now discuss this more carefully in the paper; see pages 14-15 and 17-18, as well 
as footnote 25. 
 
  
 Table. Regression results, consumption of anti-TNF drugs (DDD per 10,000 capita). 
  
Number of indication approvals 0.188
***
 (0.011) 
Ln price -0.414
***
 (0.215) 
Ln GDP per capita 0.860
***
 (0.122) 
Ln health spending as percentage of GDP 0.120
***
 (0.027) 
Base: Remicade  
Enbrel -0.251
***
 (0.097) 
Humira -0. 240
**
 (0.106) 
Ln price * France -0.545
***
 (0.174) 
Ln price * Sweden -0.586
***
 (0.153) 
Ln price * Denmark -0.543
***
 (0.136) 
Ln price * Finland -0.857
***
 (0.150) 
Ln price * Germany 0.307
**
 (0.135) 
Ln price * Italy -0.528
***
 (0.161) 
Ln price * Spain -1.060
***
 (0.152) 
Ln price * Switzerland -0.993
***
 (0.183) 
Base: Norway  
France 0.976
***
 (0.554) 
Sweden 2.233
***
 (0.501) 
Denmark 1.420
***
 (0.417) 
Finland 2.709
***
 (0.491) 
Germany -2.187
***
 (0.402) 
Italy 0.678
***
 (0.522) 
Spain 3.310
***
 (0.507) 
Switzerland 2.163
***
 (0.600) 
Time trend (ln period) 0.635
***
 (0.048) 
Constant 0.275 (0.725) 
R
2 
0.839 
Observations 2744 
***
: significant at the 1% level, 
**
: significant at the 5% level,
 *
: significant at the 10% level 
 
 
Response to Reviewer 2 
1.      The following references cited in the paper are not reported in the reference list: 
        - Page 1 (note 1): Miller and Frech (2004) This is now corrected. (It should have been Frech and Miller, 
not Miller and Frech).   
        - Page 1 (note 2):  Abbott, Merck, Amgen and Pfizer for 2011. These are annual reports that are 
publicly available at each company’s webpage. This is now explained in the footnote.  
 
2.      pag 18 There is a reference to Table A in appendix, but this table is inserted in appendix as Table 
A.1. We have now included a new version of the table in the paper (Table 4). 
 
3.      Table 3 does not include a complete list of descriptive statistics. It is necessary to give descriptive 
statistics of all the variables included in the estimation. This is now done in Table 4. Table 3 and 4 should 
cover the full list of descriptive statistics. 
 
To estimate the different regression specifications, the authors added to the data set the variable GDP (the 
natural logarithm of GDP per (10000) capita) for each country and period,  the variable (Iit)  number of 
indications, the variable (HEct)  measuring total spending on health as percentage of GDP and seasonal 
variations by dummies for quarter (Qt).. 
More details on these variables are necessary: 
-       In the paper at page 15, row 29, it is said that  GDP per capita is for each country (c) and for each 
period (t), but  Table A1 reports the descriptive statistics of GDP and total health expenses without 
specifying  the reference year (or if they are the average over years). Furthermore, it is necessary to 
mention the source of data. We have now added a new Table 4 reporting GPD and HE for each year. The 
table also includes a footnote with the data sources.  
 
-       It is also necessary to give the source of the variable (HEct) measuring total spending on health as 
percentage of GDP and if it is on yearly base or period (t) or an average over 2000-2009 (page 15, row 45 
and Table A1). We now report the source in Table 4. We have also modified the text explaining that GDP 
and HE are measured at a yearly basis, while the others at a monthly basis; see the text associated with 
Table 4 and Footnote 19). 
 
-       Page 16, row 10: it is necessary to describe with more details how the variable (Iit)  (i.e. number of 
indications) has been  generated. Also, the whole sentence is not clear enough. This is now done. See page 
16 and Table 4. We also explain the estimate more carefully (see page 18). 
 
-       Pag. 14, rows 41- 43. I wonder if it is useful to include the dummies for quarters to control for seasonal 
variations since anti-TNF drugs are used in chronic diseases. We agree and have therefore estimated the 
regression without controlling for seasonal effects (see Table 5 and specification of model on page 13).  
 
Important remark: Data of the data set are on monthly base, and the above variables are presumably on 
year base. In the estimation, does the author include the value reported in table A.1 taking into account the 
year/period or not?  Specify it. In the estimation we use yearly information on GDP and HE. We now 
explain this more clearly in the paper. See Footnote 19 and the text associated with Table 4.  
 
4.      Table 2. For Switzerland the authors indicate in the column copayment 'Marginal' without indicating 
Authors' Response to Reviewers' Comments
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any value. Specify what it means. IMS health only reported that the copayment was marginal in 
Switzerland, and did not provide an estimate of the copayment share. Unfortunately, we have not been 
able to get this figure from IMS or from other sources. 
 
5.      Table 4. It is better to specify the significant level associated to the symbols   ***, **, * (i.e. 1%, 5%, 
10%). I also wonder what selection has been done on data.  It would be better to specify how the authors 
end up with 2744 observations over 120 months. We now use the significant symbols as suggested. The 
reason that end up with 2744 over 120 months is that the three anti-TNF drugs are not present in every 
period in every country. We now explain this in Footnote 24. 
 
6.       Furthermore, I think that 'copayment' is important in the diffusion of drug, but among the regressors 
the authors do not include any variable regarding the copayement (see table 2 column 6). The main reason 
for not including this variable in the regression is that we do not have information of (changes) in the 
copayment over time within the countries in our sample. Thus, with country-specific effects we cannot 
identify the impact of copayments. Moreover, the copayments are usually related to price, which implies 
that our price variable should pick up the impact of copayments on consumption. However, the 
copayments for anti-TNF drugs are really small and in many countries actually zero, which means that the 
copayments are likely to play a limited role for consumption of these drugs. We now discuss this more 
carefully in the paper; see pages 14-15 and 17-18. 
